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  The aim of this note is to present an extremely simple generalization of the Gini 
coefficient of inequality – a generalization that displays sensitivity to the skewness of the 
Lorenz curve. The accent is on the word ‘simple’, and, indeed, the indices advanced here 
may well attract the charge, even, of simple-mindedness. The emphasis will be entirely 
on the intuitive plausibility of a certain line of reasoning, and there can be nothing of 
interest here for the scholar who insists that an impeccable axiomatic rationalization is an 
indispensable accompaniment of any proposed real-valued measure of inequality. There 
are  no  axiomatics  in  this  essay;  what  there  is,  it  seems  to  me,  is  an  intriguing  little 
curiosum, which may be worth the effort of deeper investigation. A mitigating factor for 
the unrefined simplicity of this note resides in the fact - as anybody who has had anything 
to do with Lorenz curves will appreciate - that it is difficult to resist the temptation of 
getting  up  to  tricks  of  one  kind  of  another  in  the  presence  of  the  seemingly  infinite 
possibilities offered up by the curve.  
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  A  well-known  shortcoming  of  the  Gini  coefficient  of  inequality  (G )  is  its 
inability to take account of the skewness of the Lorenz curve in assessing the extent of 
inequality  in  a  distribution.  Specifically,  G   will  pronounce  as  equally  unequal  all 
distributions  for  which  the  areas  enclosed  by  their  respective  Lorenz  curves  and  the 
diagonal  of  the  unit  square  are  the  same.  This  raises  the  question:  should  inequality 
among the relatively poorer income groups – as would be reflected in a Lorenz curve 
skewed toward (1,1) of the unit square - be regarded as more pernicious than inequality 
among the relatively richer groups – as would be reflected in a Lorenz curve skewed 
toward (0,0)? A ‘left-leaning’ ideology would probably uphold this point of view, since 
in  a  Lorenz  curve  skewed  toward  (1,1)  (that  is  to  say,  a  curve  which  ‘bulges  at  the 
bottom’), the income-share of the poorer income groups is lower than in a Lorenz curve 
skewed toward (0,0) (that is to say, a curve which ‘bulges at the top’) and which encloses 
the same area between itself and the diagonal as does the former curve. A ‘right-leaning’ 
ideology would uphold the converse point of view, and a ‘centrist’ ideology would regard 
inequality among the poorer income groups to be neither better nor worse than inequality 
among the richer groups
2. 
  Amartya Sen (1973; p.36) puts the matter thus:  
                                                 
1 Readers will recognize that the title has been lifted from earlier work by Gorman (1976).  
 
2  The  terms  ‘left-leaning’,  ‘centrist’,    and  ‘right-leaning’  are  reminiscent  of  Serge-Christophe  Kolm’s  
‘leftist’, ‘centrist’,  and ‘rightist’ designations for inequality measures. The contexts of use, however, are 
entirely different, Kolm’s concerns being with the relative merits of the so-called ‘scale invariance’ and 
‘translation invariance’ properties of inequality indices - see S-C. Kolm (1976a and 1976b). The sense in 
which the terms ‘left’, ‘right’ and ‘centre’ are employed in this note has, in fact, much to do with what 
Kolm  (op. cit.) has called the ‘principle of diminishing transfers’.     2 
 
Can it be asserted that our judgment of the extent of inequality will not vary 
according to whether the people involved are generally poor or generally rich? 
Some have taken the view that our concern with inequality increases as a society 
gets prosperous since the society can ‘afford’ to be inequality-conscious. Others 
have asserted that the poorer an economy, the more ‘disastrous’ the consequences 
of  inequality,  so  that  inequality  measures  should  be  sharper  for  low  average 
income.  This  is  a  fairly  complex  question  and  is  bedeviled  by  a  mixture  of 
positive  and  normative  considerations.  The  view  that  for  poorer  economies 
inequality measures must be themselves sharper can be contrasted with the view 
that greater importance must be attached to any given inequality measure if the 
economy  is  poorer.  The  former  incorporates  the  value  in  question  into  the 
measure of inequality itself, while the latter brings it in through the evaluation of 
the relative importance of a given measure at different levels of average income. 
 
  My own concern here will be with the first of the two types of exercise that Sen 
alludes to at the conclusion of the quoted passage. I shall advance a specific approach to 
the  incorporation,  into  the  inequality  measure  itself,  of  alternative  values  relating  to 
whether  or  not  the  measure  should  be  sharper  for  poorer  societies.  This  approach 
proposes a family of inequality measures,  ) (λ G , where λ  is in the nature of an ‘indicator 
of inter-group inequality aversion’. For parametric variation in  λ  (within bounds that 
will be discussed later),  ) (⋅ G  will be seen to exhibit varying degrees of sensitivity to the 
skewness of the Lorenz curve
3.  
3 
  There  are  different  notational  ways  of  representing  the  Lorenz  curve,  and  in 
setting out the preliminary formalities, it is of great assistance to draw on the work of 
Nanak  Kakwani  (1980b).  One  can  begin  by  letting  x  stand  for  a  random  variable 
designating (say) income, distributed, with mean  µ , over the interval  ] , 0 [ x .  ) (x f  is the 
density  function  of  x  (the  proportion  of  the  population  with  incomex),  ) (x F the 
cumulative density function (the cumulative proportion of the population with incomes 
not exceeding  x), and  ) ( 1 x F the first-moment distribution function (the cumulative share 
in income of the population with incomes not exceeding  x): 
∫ =
x
dy y f x F
0
















0 ) ( ) ( 1 0 0 = = → → x F Lim x F Lim x x ; and  1 ) ( ) ( 1 = = → → x F Lim x F Lim x x x x . 
The  Lorenz curve is simply the  functional relational between  ) ( 1 x F and  ) (x F  and is 
drawn in Figure 1: as plotted in the unit square, the curve for an unequal distribution, 
typically, would be an increasing and strictly convex one, running from (0,0) to (1,1) of 
                                                 
3 For alternative generalizations of the Gini coefficient, see Kakwani (1980a); Donaldson and Weymark 
(1980); and Yitzhaki (1983).     3 
the square; for an equal distribution, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the 
￿ 45 line, 
or diagonal of the unit square, which is the ‘line of equality’. 
 
  Consider a measure of central tendency – call it  * x  - such that the poorest  *) (x F  
proportion  of  the  population  earn  *)) ( 1 ( x F −   proportion  of  the  total  income.  It  is 
convenient to regard  * x  in the light of a certain distinguished ‘relative’ poverty line 
which separates the relatively poorer segment of the population from its relatively richer 
segment.  * x , clearly, is the income level corresponding to which the Lorenz curve (see 
Figure  1)  intersects  the  diagonal  drawn  from  (0,1)  to  (1,0)  of  the  unit  square  (this 
diagonal is referred to by Kakwani 1980b  as the ‘alternative diagonal’). In what follows, 
I shall simplify the notation somewhat: the cumulative proportion of the population with 
incomes no higher than  * x ,  *) (x F , will be written as just  * F  , while the cumulative   4 
income share of the poorest  * F  proportion of the population,  *) ( 1 x F , will be written as 
just  * 1 F . 
  The Gini coefficient of inequality in the distribution of income is given by the 
following well-known expression (again see Kakwani 1980b for a derivation): 
∫ − =
x
dx x f x F G
0
1 ) ( ) ( 2 1 , or, equivalently, 
] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( [ 2 1
*
0 *
1 1 ∫ ∫ + − =
x x
x
dx x f x F dx x f x F G .                                                                       (1) 
Letting  1 G  and  2 G  stand for the Gini coefficients of inequality in the distribution of 
income  among,  respectively,  those  with  incomes  not  exceeding  * x   and  those  with 
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x
F F G F F dx x f x F ;                                                                     (2) 
and  
∫ − − − − − =
x
x
F F F F dx x f x F G
*
1 1 2 *) 1 *)( 1 /( *)] 1 ( * ) ( ) ( [ 2 1 , so that  
*) 1 ( * 2 *) 1 *)( 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2
*
1 F F F F G dx x f x F
x
x
− + − − − = ∫ .                                             (3) 
From  (2)  and  (3),  and  making  use  of  the  fact  that  since  *) *, ( 1 F F   is  a  point  on  the 
alternative diagonal of the unit square, so that  1 * * 1 = +F F , one has: 
∫ − − =
*
0
1 1 ) 1 *)( 1 ( * ) ( ) ( 2
x





1 *) 1 ( 2 ) 1 *)( 1 ( * ) ( ) ( 2 F G F F dx x f x F
x
x
− + − − = ∫ .                                                         (5) 
Making the appropriate substitutions from (4) and (5) into (1) yields: 
] *) 1 ( 2 ) 1 *)( 1 ( * ) 1 *)( 1 ( * [ 1
2
2 1 F G F F G F F G − + − − + − − − =  











 + − − − = G G F F G .                                                                         (6) 
Writing  G  in the form of (6) has the advantage of bringing sharply into focus the fact 
that Gini can be written as a weighted sum of  1 G  and  2 G , with the weights on  1 G  and 
2 G  being identical. This paves the way  for what one could see to be  a  very natural 
generalization of G  to a (parametrized) family of measures that we may call  ) (λ G , and 
which is given by 
( ) ] 1 , 0 [ ], ) 1 ( * 1 *)[ 1 ( 2 1 ) ( 2 1 ∈ − + − − − = λ λ λ λ G G F F G .                                                (7)   5 
λ , appearing on the Right Hand Side of (7), may be regarded as an indicator of 
‘relative inter-group inequality aversion’, the groups in question being constituted by, 
respectively,  the  relatively  poor  population  and  the  relatively  rich  population.  In 
principle, one could let λ  take any value in the closed interval [0,1]. For  ) 2 / 1 , 0 [ ∈ λ , we 
would  have  a  continuum  of  (decreasingly)  ‘right-leaning’  inequality  measures.  For 
2 / 1 = λ , we would have a ‘centrist’ inequality measure – which is, precisely, the Gini 
coefficient. For  ] 1 , 2 / 1 ( ∈ λ , we would have a continuum of (increasingly) ‘left-leaning’ 
inequality  measures.  In  assessing  overall  inequality,  λ   and  ) 1 ( λ −   are  the  relative 
weights assigned to inequality among the ‘poorer’ and the ‘richer’ groups respectively, 
the two groups, to recall, being separated from one another by the ‘relative poverty line’ 
* x .   1 = λ  would correspond to Rawls’ maximin rule (only the claim of the worse-off of 
the  two  groups  matters),  and  0 = λ   would  correspond  to  an  extreme  anti-Rawlsian 
‘maximax’ rule (only the claim of the better-off of the two groups matters). In general, an 
‘egalitarian’  bias  is  injected  by  confining  λ   to  the  interval  ] 1 , 2 / 1 ( .  Note  that,  for 
2 / 1 > λ , 
< > − − − = − , ) )( 2 / 1 *)( 1 ( * 2 ) ( 2 1 G G F F G G λ λ  or = 0 according as  < >, 1 G  or =  2 G : 
) (λ G  exceeds  G  if the Lorenz curve is skewed toward (1,1) of the unit square, is less 
than  G  if the Lorenz curve is skewed toward (0,0), and coincides withG  if the Lorenz 
curve is symmetric. This property realizes the intuitive appropriateness (if one is left-
leaning!) of penalizing a distribution for which the Lorenz curve is skewed toward (1,1) 
of the unit square relative to a distribution for which it is skewed toward (0,0). From a 
purely pragmatic point of view, an advantage with the proposed generalization of Gini is 
that the policy maker may not find it terribly hard to ‘understand the meaning’ of  λ :  λ  
is, after all, in the nature of a straightforward proportional weight placed on the extent of 
inequality among the ‘poorer’ income groups
4.  
  Additionally, there is a particular value of λ  - ¾ as it happens - which yields up a 
very  simple,  intuitively  clear,  and  visually  appealing  left-leaning  variant  of  the  Gini 
coefficient, which is greater than, equal to, or less than G  according as the Lorenz curve 
is skewed toward (1,1), symmetric, or skewed toward (0,0). The index  ) 4 / 3 ( G  may be 
called 
M G , the superscript ‘M’ standing for (Professor M. N.) Murthy, who proposed the 
index to the author in personal conversation. The interesting feature about the index 
M G  
is  that  it  is  very  simply  given  (I  desist  here  from  providing  a  demonstration)  by: 
) ( B A G G
M − + =  where – see Figure 1 -  A is the area enclosed by the diagonal of the 
unit square and the Lorenz curve, marked ORT, to the left of the alternative diagonal, and 
B  is the area enclosed by the diagonal of the unit square and the Lorenz curve, marked 
TRU, to the right of the alternative diagonal. 
  Finally, a swift and simple example may help to illustrate the concerns of this 
note, and also possibly assist in giving content to the distinction between ‘left-leaning’ 
                                                 
4 In a minor aside, it may be noted that this relative ‘interpretation-friendliness’ is perhaps slightly in 
contrast with the status that obtains in many standard formulations of inequality aversion, in which the 
magnitude of this quantity is sought to be captured by the value of the exponent in a power function. It is a 
bit  hard  to  imagine  the  average  lay  policy-maker  feeling  entirely  comfortable  about  making  informed 
judgments on the degree of convexity s/he wishes, through restrictions on the value of the exponent, to 
impart to the curvature of an underlying social welfare function!      6 
and ‘right-leaning’ inequality judgments. Imagine a population of 1 million persons with 
a mean income of 2 Rupees, and let  i x  be the income of the ith poorest person. Consider 
two distributions x and y respectively, such that, in distribution x: 
; 000 , 500 ,..., 1 0 = ∀ = i xi  
     =  000 , 1000 ,..., 001 , 500 4 = ∀i ; 
and in distribution y: 
; 999 , 999 ,..., 1 ) 9999 . 1 ( 999 , 999 / 900 , 1999 = ∀ ≅ = i xi  
     = 100 for  000 , 1000 = i . 
It is a simple matter to see that the Lorenz curve for distribution x – see Figure 2 – is 
given  by  the  curve  OPQ  (where  P  is  the  point  (1/2,0)),  while  the  Lorenz  curve  for 
distribution y is given by the curve ONQ (where N is the point (1,1/2)). Clearly, the 
Lorenz curve for x is skewed toward (1,1) of the unit square, while the Lorenz curve for y 
is skewed toward (0,0). Noting that the Gini coefficient of inequality is twice the area 
enclosed by the Lorenz curve and the diagonal of the unit square, it follows that the Gini 
coefficients for the distributions x and y are given, respectively, by G(x) = 2AreaOPQ = 
2(AreaOPJK + AreaKJQ), and  G(y)  = 2AreaONQ = 2(AreaOJK + AreaKJNQ).  It is 
straightforward  to  see  that  AreaOPJK  =  AreaKJNQ  ) , ( 1 say ∆ ≡ ,  while  AreaKJQ  = 
AreaOJK  ( ) , 2 say ∆ ≡ .  That  is,  the  Gini  coefficients  for  the  two  distributions  are 
identically the same, at, say, G. Now the index G
M for  the two distributions will be 
given, repectively, by G
M(x) = G + AreaOPJK – AreaKJQ =  ) ( 2 1 ∆ − ∆ + G , and G
M(y) = 
G + AreaOJK – AreaKJNQ = G – (AreaKJNQ – AreaOJK) =  ) ( 2 1 ∆ − ∆ − G , so that if 
we designate  ) 0 )( ( 2 1 > ∆ − ∆  by  ∆, we have: G
M(x) = G +∆ > G
M(y) = G -∆: the ‘left-
leaning’ inequality index G
M will penalize the distribution (x) for which the Lorenz curve 
is skewed toward (1,1)  of the unit square vis-à-vis the distribution (y) for which the 
Lorenz curve is skewed toward (0,0). Why might this be a reasonable outcome? To see 
this, consider the following circumstantial details which, while they may not be strictly 
necessary for the argument, may yet assist in comprehending its thrust. Suppose 1 Rupee 
is  a  poverty  line  such  that  those  with  incomes  below  this  line  are  certified  as  being 
absolutely impoverished. Notice that in distribution y no person is poor, though a vast 
majority  of  the  population  are  very  much  worse  off  than  a  single  extremely  rich 
individual. In contrast, 50 per cent of the population in distribution x are not just poor but 
wholly destitute, even though the majority of the non-poor in x are better off than in y. If 
our focus is on the poorer population and our differential sympathy resides with this 
section of the population, then it would be natural to deem x as a worse distribution than 
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Figure 2: Distributions with Skewed 




Note : The Lorenz curve OPQ is skewed toward (1,1), while the curve ONQ is skewed 
toward (0,0).  Both distributions share the same value of the Gini coefficient. 
 
4 
  It remains to summarize and conclude. In this note, I have explored an elementary 
approach to sensitizing an inequality measure to the skewness of the Lorenz curve. This 
approach develops a simple and natural generalization  ) (λ G  of the Gini coefficient of 
inequality  G . While Gini is insensitive to whether inequality is more pronounced at the 
lower or the upper end of the distribution, its generalized form  ) (λ G  permits, through 
selection of appropriate (‘right-leaning’/`centrist’/`left-leaning’) values for the parameter 
λ , judgments on ‘relative inter-group inequality aversion’ to be directly incorporated in 
the inequality measure. A special case of  ) (λ G  has been proposed. This is the index 
M G . 
M G ,  which  is  an  uncomplicated  measure  that  makes  a  direct  visual  appeal  to  the 
beholder, penalizes a Lorenz curve skewed toward (1,1) of the unit square relative to a 
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